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The World Economy >. Towards Full Employment 
and Price Stab i l i ty? 
* 
In a major study , commissioned by the OECD, and published in June 
of this year, a group of economists have set down thei r analysis 
of the past, present, and l i ke ly future performance of the 
world economy. I t is perhaps inevitable that a report which 
deals with as heterogeneous a subject as the world economy tends 
to be somewhat lean on policy prescript ions. Nonetheless, this 
shortcoming is more than compensated by an extensively documented 
analysis of developments in the world economy over the past 
decade. The strength of the analysis l ies in the breadth of i t s 
perspective. A l l too o f ten, i t has been assumed that the 
problems of the world economy are solely due to the OPEC 
inspired o i l price r ise of the winter of 1973-74. This view has 
persisted in spite of the publication of numerous studies which 
have estimated the f u l l impact of the price r ise as an increase 
of perhaps 3-5% in the price level of most industr ia l economies. 
The OECD study places the OPEC action in perspective, and 
ident i f ies the roots of the recent recession as stretching at 
least a decade in to the past. Furthermore, i t leaves l i t t l e 
doubt that pol icy errors from the late 1960's onwards contributed 
to the severi ty of the downturn. For this reason alone, i t is 
worth looking at the OECD thesis in some de ta i l . 
From the mid s ix t ies onwards, i t became obvious that the American 
involvement in Vietnam was l i ke l y to be both extensive and long 
term. However, i t s impact on the American economy was substantial ly 
underestimated, and i t s broader effects on the world economy 
scarcely considered. Under the pressure of heavy mi l i ta ry 
spending the American balance of payments ran substantial def ic i ts 
in the years 1965-67. In the f ixed exchange rate world of the 
s i x t i es , the counterpart of the American d e f i c i t was the expansion 
in the money supply of her trading partners. As the pressure of 
aggregate demand throughout the world began to r i se , i n f l a t i on 
started to creep upwards. Strong labour unrest in Europe in 1968 -
the so-called wage explosion - reinforced this trend. The boom 
was restrained in 1969 by deflationary action taken mainly in the 
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United States, but inf lat ionary expectations had already been 
aroused and were influencing wage negotiations in many countries. 
The subsequent slowdown of in f la t ion in 1970-71 did l i t t l e to 
dispel such expectations, and the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
f ixed exchange regime in mid-1971 provided the means to 
validate these varying inf la t ionary tendencies. The world 
economy was headed for a boom. 
1972 was an election year in Germany, Japan and the US and i t 
appears that the level of aggregate demand in these three major 
economies was boosted somewhat to secure the re-election of the 
incumbent administrations, an important factor in the subsequent 
synchronisation of the business cycles. Over the eighteen 
months to mid-1973, the world experienced the most rapid upswing 
of the post-war period, What was outstanding was, not the levels 
of capacity u t i l i sa t i on reached, which appear to have been lower 
than in 1968, but the speed of the expansion, Monetary policy 
was generally permissive, and in f la t ion-proof assets such as real 
estate and gold began to r ise rapidly in pr ice. Widespread crop 
fai lures in the Eastern world reinforced the inf la t ionary trend 
as food prices rose. Rising pressure of demand l i f t e d raw 
material prices and,in time,wages began to catch up. The wage 
price spiral was to become ins t i tu t iona l ised through indexation 
and threshold agreements in many countries. Faced with 
unprecedently high rates of i n f l a t i on combined with large margins 
of unuti l ised resources, expecially in the labour market, the ' 
major OECD countries had adopted a contractionary stance by mid-
1973. Thus, in the months preceding the o i l c r i s i s , real GDP 
growth slowed markedly, but the same was not true of in f la t ion 
which was buoyed upwards as wage bargains attempted to 
compensate for past price r ises, and as inf la t ionary expectations 
rose further. Nonetheless, some components of generalised 
i n f l a t i o n , such as commodity prices had already begun to decline. 
The quadrupling of o i l prices had three main effects on the 
developed countries. I t weakened thei r col lect ive current 
account balance of payments, i t further fuel led the i r i n f l a t i o n , 
and i t reinforced the contractionary effects of domestic pol ic ies. 
While the effects were clear, the appropriate policy response 
was not. In many cases, governments faced with renewed 
inf lat ionary pressures, adapted a s t i l l more deflationary stance 
than heretofore. To this extent, the OPEC action merely 
deepened the recession which was already breaking over the 
developed world. The deteriorat ion in the terms of trade facing 
the non-oil producing states was equivalent to a reduction in their 
real incomes. Yet how was this reduction to be distr ibuted 
amongst the "social partners"? In the short run i t was absorbed 
by pro f i ts - for three reasons. Price controls depressed p r o f i t 
margins as input prices rose, wage increases in late 1973 and 
into 1974 were substant ial , even in low in f la t ion economies such 
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as Germany, and the h is to r ica l cost accounting techniques then in 
use were inappropriate for an in f la t ionary period. Over the 
somewhat longer term labour income was also affected, as the 
numbers employed f e l l and as real earnings f e l l for those in 
employment. These effects were reinforced as in f la t ionary wage 
settlements came into con f l i c t with r i g i d money supply regimes 
in countries such as Germany. In many cases, i t was the 
marginal members of the labour force, such as school leavers and 
migrant workers who bore the brunt. Countries di f fered in the 
time path of the i r reactions. In the US and Germany the 
adjustment to the real income f a l l was accomplished quite sharply, 
others such as Br i ta in and France t r i ed to maintain the pre-
cr is is level of real incomes, and merely succeeded in accumulating 
budgetary and balance of payments def ic i ts and in postponing 
the necessary adjustments. 
The severity of the recession was becoming apparent by mid-1974, 
by which time pol icy was again becoming expansionary in those 
countries which deflated ea r l i es t , the US, Germany and Japan. 
Meanwhile, the volume of world trade was sustained somewhat by 
strong demand from less developed countries flush with the proceeds 
of the commodity price boom of the previous year. A f r ag i l e , and 
by no means world-wide, recovery was i n i t i a ted in mid-1975 as 
ref lat ionary packages began to take e f fec t , and as deferred 
purchases of consumer durables became important in the US and 
Germany. But by early 1976, the strength of the recovery was 
somewhat in doubt as i n f l a t i on appeared to rek indle, and as 
budgetary and balance of payments constraints began to i n h i b i t 
further ref lat ionary action in the majority of countries. This 
period saw considerable ac t i v i t y in foreign exchange markets as 
par i t ies adjusted with a lag to account for variations in national 
i n f l a t i on rates over the previous few years. Those industries 
whose currencies suffered sharp depreciation, such as I t a l y , France 
and the UK saw the prospect of single d i g i t i n f l a t i on recede even 
farther into the future. 
Then began the present period of export led stagnation. Governments 
everywhere, with the exception of the US refrained from stimulating 
domestic demand for budgetary and balance of payments reasons, and 
waited instead for export demand to prime the i r economies. However, 
the only and woefully inadequate source of export demand was the US, 
and so began the "pause" of mid-1976. As the year progressed calls 
were made even more s t r ident ly that those countries enjoying a strong 
balance of payments pos i t ion , i . e . Germany and Japan, should re f la te 
domestic demand and so suck in imports. This cal l is also made in 
the OECD report , and recent policy measures would suggest that i t is 
now being heeded. However, the cautious policy stance currently being 
adopted would suggest that the prime val idat ing factor of the 1972-73 
boom and the 1974-75 recession, (the two must be looked at together), 
i e . excessive expansion of monetary aggregates over the past decade, 
is unl ikely to be repeated. 
